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Keats the Humanist
Ernest f. Lovell, ]r., and John Clubbe 1

Of the major Romantic poets, Keats was the latest born, the earliest
to die, the shortest lived, the most likeable, the most easily lovable.
His mature creative life was incredibly brief-his first perfect poem,
"On First Looking into Chapman's Homer," being written in October 1816, his last perfect poem, 'To Autumn," slightly less than
three years later, on 19 September 1819. In his letters we observe a
mind functioning at its best over a period of about three years,
when Keats was aged twenty-one to twenty-four years. On 3 February 1820 he suffered a violent hemorrhage of the lungs; in September, dying, he sailed for Italy. Keats wrote some of the finest
letters in the language, but until his illness they are the letters of a
young man. There was much that he did not have time to read or
to think about. These few dates suggest the tremendous intensity
with which, for a startlingly brief period, Keats thought about his
art and worked to create it.
Although Keats never systematized his literary theory and the
thoughts about the nature of human existence that we find scattered
and evolving in his letters, much of this theory and speculation possesses a remarkable harmony or unity that derives directly from
certain basic qualities of his character. Perhaps chief among these
personal qualities is one easier to name in negative than in positive
terms: the usual and genuine absence in him of self-assertiveness.
The dogmatic tone or spirit was not his, and he disliked dogmatic
men and arguments, believing that it was more blessed to listen,
learn, and explore than to preach in support of a pre-selected text.
There is thus an unusual gentleness about Keats's strength of mind.
Because of the basically explorative thrust of his thinking, he was
reluctant to reach closed-end conclusions.
These personal qualities derive finally, it would appear, from
Keats's stalwart selflessness wholly without neurotic fears or the
need to feel himself loved by everyone who came his way. In his
letter to George and Tom Keats of 21, 27(?) December 1817, sandwiched between his remarks contrasting Benjamin West's painting
Death on the Pale Horse with King Lear and his account of Neg3
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ative Capability, is a description of a dinner with Horace Smith,
"his two brothers" and three other men of literary interests. 2 The
letter suggests how easily Keats moved between the social world
and the solitary world of literary theory. Of these six men, only
Horace and James Smith, as co-authors of Rejected Addresses
(1812) and Horace in London (1813), had any literary reputation.
John Kingston, who was Deputy Controller of Stamps and to
whom Wordsworth deferred, was also among those present. By and
large, they were men of wit and fashion. But Keats felt little or no
sympathetic identification with them, no admiration for them, no
desire to become like them. At the age of twenty-two, he was already his own man, well acquainted with his own identity, feeling
no need to impress these assembled wits of the fashionable world. It
made no difference to him that his host Horace Smith, a friend of
Shelley, was a highly successful satirist and stockbroker or that
James Smith was reputed to be one of the wittiest of conversationalists in an age that elevated conversation to a fine art. "These
men," Keats observed,
say things which make one start, without making one feel,
they are all alike; their manners are alike; they all know fashionables; they have a mannerism in their very eating &
drinking, in their mere handling a Decanter-They talked of
Kean & his low company-Would I were with that company
instead of yours said I to myself! I know such like acquaintance will never do for me (I, 193).
Byron, who said he never drew well with literary men (except Scott
and Moore), would have agreed. 3 Different as they were, both
Keats and Byron were men of independent spirit.
Keats's equally Byronic reluctance to embrace some set of final
conclusions and then live comfortably with it from that day forward, for better or for worse, may express itself as a kind of simple
skepticism. Thus in the famous letter to Benjamin Bailey of 22 November 1817, he is "certain of nothing but" two grandly epic concepts, "the holiness of the Heart's affections and the truth of Imagination" (1, 184) . But four months later, on 13 March 1818, he is
boldly skeptical of his own skepticism. After referring to his religious skepticism as a thing well known to Bailey, he in effect denies
it-"1 do not think myself more in the right than other people"and then he qualifies his denial: "I must once for all tell you I have
4
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not one Idea of the truth of any of my speculations" (I, 242, 243) .
Keats was not of course a confirmed or philosophic skeptic, denying the possibility of certain knowledge; it is the questioning, questing nature of his mind that here expresses itself, his way of protecting himself against the dogmatic utterance of the assertive self. And
so as a kind of New Year's resolution on 31 December 1818, he
"made up [his] Mind never to take any thing for granted-but even
to examine the truth of the commonest proverbs" (II, 18).
Distrusting, like Blake, the abstracting and deductive faculty of
the reason as dogmatic and self-assertive, Keats sought other methods of grasping reality: "I never can feel certain of any truth but
from a clear perception of its Beauty" (31 Dec. 1818: II, 19). Almost inevitably, William Godwin becomes the enemy. Charles
Wentworth Dilke, the true opposite, not the contrary, of the poet
of negative capability, is "a Godwin-methodist" (24 Sept. 1819: II,
213) and elsewhere a "Godwin perfectibil[it]y Man" (14 Oct. 1818:
I, 397). He "was a Man who cannot feel he has a personal identity
unless he has made up his Mind about every thing . The only means
of strengthening one's intellect is to make up one's mind about
nothing-to let the mind be a thoroughfare for all thoughts" (24
Sept. 1819: II, 213) . Thus even a preliminary consideration illustrates the fact that Keats's skepticism, his open-minded questing
spirit, the natural enemy and antidote to dogmatic self-assertiveness, is linked with such important areas of his thought as religion,
the nature and function of the imagination, the nature of the self,
negative capability, and human reason.
Keats's metaphor of the chameleon poet, a metaphor he took
from Hazlitt, is also closely tied to all this. Specifically, it appears
in the absence in him of a strong streak of self-assertiveness, as in
his distinction in The Fall of Hyperion between true poets and
"mock lyrists, large self-worshippers I And careless hectorers in
proud bad verse" (I, 207-208)-perhaps a reference to Byron. "Man
should not dispute or assert,"· Keats wrote to John Hamilton Reynolds, "but whisper results to his neighbour, and thus ... every
human might become great, and Humanity ... would become a
grand democracy" (19 Feb. 1818: I, 232). The world, in short,
would be transformed. As for himself, he stated, with his usual insight into his own being, "I shall never be a Reasoner because I care
not to be in the right, when retired from bickering and in a proper
philosophical temper" (13 March 1818: I, 243).
Keats's distrust of the disputatious and assertive man, like God5
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win or Dilke, surely explains much about his anticlericalism. As
early as December 1816 he composed a sonnet "Written in Disgust
of Vulgar Superstition." He found the Bishop of Lincoln to be "tyran[n]ical" and worse (3 Nov. 1817: I, 178); a parson "must be
either a Knave or an Ideot" (14 Feb. 1819: II, 63); and the "history"
of Jesus, the only man Keats knew of with a completely disinterested heart, except for Socrates, was lamentably "written and revised by Men interested in the pious frauds of Religion" (19 March
1819: II, 80). This is very like Shelley, who more than once paired
Jesus and Socrates. No wonder that Keats wrote of himself on 22
December 1818, "I am reckoned lax in my christian principles" (II,
14).
But in important ways he was deeply and knowledgeably Christian, as well as being a close student of the Bible like the other Romantic poets. He was baptized in the Church of England, and on
his deathbed his friend Joseph Severn read to him from Jeremy Taylor's Holy Living and Holy Dying. The headmaster of the school at
Enfield, where Keats was a student from 1803 to 1811, was the Rev.
John Clarke, who influenced his development. Keats's letter to his
sister on 31 March 1819, instructing her in preparation for her confirmation, demonstrates how very knowledgeable he was of Anglican doctrine and of the Bible. In answer to just one of her questions, he refers her to twelve Biblical passages (II, 49-51). His faith
in an immortal afterlife seems firm; earthly happiness will then be
repeated "in a finer tone" (22 Nov. 1817: I, 185). Among "the grandeurs of immortality" will be the perfect understanding that the disembodied spirits will have of each other, existing outside space in
the form of pure intelligence. On this day, 16 December 1818, he
had "scarce a doubt of immortality of some nature" (II, 5, 4). But
even more significant and revealing is the fact that two of his most
famous letters-the Mansion of Life letter and the Vale of SoulMaking letter- are conceived in important part in Christian terms
and rest upon Christian assumptions.
The earlier letter, to Reynolds of 3 May 1818, is centrally concerned with comparing the virtues of Milton and Wordsworth: the
grounds are explicitly humanitarian or humanistic but implicitly
they are Christian. Keats saw human life as process or growth of
mind just as truly and habitually as Wordsworth or Byron. It was a
movement from innocence to experience and beyond, as in Blakeand as in Byron's Don Juan, however great the disparities among
each's respective visions. In life's "large Mansion of Many Apart6
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ments," the first is "the infant or thoughtless Chamber, in which we
remain as long as we do not think." When we begin to reflect upon
life we move into "the Chamber of Maiden-Thought," where "we
become intoxicated with the light and the atmosphere, we see nothing but pleasant wonders, and think of delaying there for ever in
delight." In that Chamber one also undergoes a "sharpening [of]
one's vision into the heart <head> and nature of Man." The experience has the effect of "convincing ones nerves that the World is
full of Misery and Heartbreak, Pain, Sickness and oppression" (I,
280, 281). Eventually many doors open out of the Chamber of
Maiden-Thought, "all dark-all leading to dark passages-We see
not the ballance of good and evil." 4 To this point, Keats believed,
Wordsworth had come when he wrote Tintem Abbey. Because "his
Genius is explorative of those dark Passages," it is "deeper" or more
profound than Milton's (I, 281). He judges Wordsworth to be superior because he has a greater "anxiety for Humanity" and
"martyrs himself to the human heart" (I, 278-79), into which he has
thought more deeply and more sympathetically than Milton, even
though Milton's philosophic powers were surely as great as Wordsworth's. From this Keats concluded that "a mighty providence subdues the mightiest Minds to the service of the time being" (I, 282).
Quite as significant in the present context is Keats's third and last
Chamber of Life. Although he gave it but one isolated sentence (he
says at this time he could describe only two), it is obviously a
chamber of redemption or salvation. It will be stored with the wine
and bread of communion, "the wine of love-and the Bread of
Friendship" (I, 283).
The great Vale of Soul-Making passage of 21 April 1819 in
Keats's long journal-letter to George and Georgiana Keats explicitly
deals with some of the central Christian questions and assumptions-the "Protection of Providence" (uncertain), the nature of
human nature (imperfect), the existence of evil (necessary). "Man is
originally 'a poor [bare] forked creature,'" like Adam after the Fall,
and "subject to the same mischances as the beasts of the forest."
Even if mankind could achieve happiness, Keats argued, the approach of death would then become intolerable, and the individual
"would leave this world as Eve left Paradise." "But in truth," Keats
adds, "I do not at all believe in this sort of perfectibility-the nature of the world will not admit of it" (II, 101). Keats, like Byron,
also rejected the doctrine of Christ the Redeemer, whose rewards
are to be had only in heaven. At several points his tough-minded
7
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and realistic insight into the nature of human existence recalls
Byron. 5 But the imperfect creature here described is obviously in
need of redemption, and Keats provided his own "system of salvation" in his concept of a "World of Pains and troubles" as a "vale
of Soul-making" (not a vale of tears), which neatly justifies the
ways of God to man and solves the philosophic problem of evil (II,
102). Thus closely linked are the principles of poetry and theology.
Imperfect though man is, however, he comes from God, like
Adam, and on 21 April1819 Keats's concept of man's divine origin
was as exalted as William Blake's or that of any other Christian. Intelligences, as distinct from the souls that will be created, are
"sparks of the divinity"; they are "atoms of perception ... in short
they are God," to whom they may return (II, 102). As Blake said,
"All deities reside in the human breast." 6 Because God is One, these
sparks of the divinity "must feel and suffer in a thousand diverse
ways" in order to become unique "individual beings," that is, to
become souls possessed of "the sense of Identity" (II, 102, 103).
Thus Keats explains the infinite variety of man and, by implication,
the unique value of each. Man, for both Keats and Blake, is a fallen
creature, in need of salvation. Keats's "system of salvation," which
he argues is far grander "than [that of] the chryst<e>ain religion," is essentially Christian in spirit and in its major assumptions (II, 102).
Keats, with his Christian background, must have found it easy
to nourish the basically non-assertive, non-dogmatic nature of his
personality. This background led him to new insights into poetry
and the nature of "the poetical Character" (I, 386). Esthetic and ethical insights become one. Although he phrases his discussion in
terms of esthetics (or the psychology of the creative process and
person), its implications, as with Blake and Shelley, are ethical. The
egotistical poet~Wordsworth, for example-is both bully and selfdeceived (I, 223). Such a poet, as Keats understood the matter at
this time, violates the sanctity of other human personalities. Similarly, Leigh Hunt's "self delusions are very-lamentable ... . There
is no greater Sin after the 7 deadly than to flatter oneself into an
idea of being a great Poet" (11 May 1817: I, 143). Such literary criticism is clearly ethical in its assumptions, and self-deception or selfflattery became for Keats the worst sin possible for a poet. It became, in effect, the eighth deadly sin, the equivalent of Blake's sin
of Selfhood. "Complete disinterestedness of Mind" or heart, he
found, had been possessed only by Socrates and Jesus, great men
8
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both, though neither left to posterity writings of their own (19
March 1819: II, 79, 80). But the great critical insight that Keats's
sensitivity to egotism allowed him to achieve was his distinction between the "wordsworthian or egotistical sublime" and the "carnelian
Poet" of "no Identity" (27 Oct. 1818: I, 387)-or Keats himself.
One feels it was inevitable that he should have perceived this, for
Keats was in fact perceiving a fundamental aspect of his own being,
his fearless selflessness, which would probably have permitted him,
had he lived, to have excelled marvelously in the drama, creating a
host of richly diverse characters.
Although there is early evidence of Keats's capacity for sympathetic identification with that or those outside the self, the
Chameleon-Poet letter of 27 October 1818 is the first in which the
phrase (verbally reminiscent of Shelley on Byron)7 appears and thus
deserves examination in detail. Significantly, the letter opens with a
celebration of Richard Woodhouse's "friendliness" and goes on almost at once to define Keats's kind of poetical character in terms of
selflessness, the absence of the egotistical-"it has no self" (I, 386,
387). The implication is that the poet of "the wordsworthian or
egotistical sublime" is confined, bound by and to itself in subject,
point of view, and tone. (Note Keats's use of the lower-case "w" for
Wordsworth's name, as the younger poet symbolically converts the
older to his own doctrine.) This poet is, like Shakespeare's Ajax, "a
thing [i.e., a man] per se and stands alone. " By contrast, the
chameleon Keatsian poet is a being of immense variety and
breadth, delighting in all levels of existence, unconfined by puritanical or rationalistic restraints. All his imaginative creations, whether
dark or bright, treacherous or wronged, !ago or Imogen, "end in
speculation" for the reader and are accompanied by the ranging delight he feels in the poet of "no Identity," "no self." This poet is the
purified Blakean Milton, completely free of the sin of selfhood and
escaped into or "filling some other Body. " For such a poet, "it is a
wretched thing to confess; but ts a very fact that not one word I
ever utter can be taken for granted as an opinion growing out of
my identical nature-how can it, when I have no nature?" Shakespeare is Keats's example par excellence of the poet who possesses
Negative Capability. Such a poet quite literally lives not in the
limited self but in other selves, where is his true home: when "in a
room with People . .. then not myself goes home to myself: but
the identity of every one in the room begins to [for so?] to press
upon me that, I am in a very little time an[ni]hilated-not only
9
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among Men; it would be the same in a Nursery of children" (I,
387) . Thus did Keats carry out, in the great generous depths of his
being, the Blakean, Christian command: "Selfhood ... must be put
off & annihilated." 8 None of this implies that Keats suffered gladly
dull or uninteresting persons, "unpleasant human identities . . . people who have no light and shade." To be in such company is "a capital punishment" (17 March 1819: II, 77). He was of
course selective.
The Byronic and the Shelleyan chameleon poet, each in his different way, could sometimes but not always attain this loss of the
sense of identity. In his self-pitying "Stanzas written in DejectionDecember 1818, near Naples" Shelley failed. At the end of his journal kept for Augusta in September 1816 Byron recorded his own
failure: nothing he had seen in his tour of the Alps had, he said,
"enabled me to lose my own wretched identity in the majesty & the
power and the Glory-around-above-& beneath me ." 9 Keats's
poet, by contrast, "is continually in for-and filling some other
Body-The Sun, the Moon, the Sea and Men and Women ." This is
the expansionist urge to move outside the self, to unite with that
which is the not-self, evident in all these poets, and of which one of
Keats's great expressions is in Endymion, I, 777-815 . Such a selfless
poet has a "relish of the dark side of things" as well as a "taste for
the bright one." He delights in all aspects of existence, unlike the
"virtuous philosop[h]er," who may be shocked within his rigidly
moralistic system of thought (I, 387).
The experience of self-annihilation may succeed or fail on any of
several levels-the imaginative or artistically creative, the spiritual
or religious, and the purely ethical. Keats could achieve it variously, sometimes as a temporary escape from a sense of unhappiness:
"if a Sparrow come before my Window I take part in its existence
and pick about the Gravel" (22 Nov. 1817: I, 186) . He once imagined himself a "Billiard-Ball" (I, 147), which he conceived might
"have a sense of delight from its own roundness, smoothness volubility & the rapidity of its motion." 10 Imaginative identification with
another object could even lift him out of depression. 'The first
thing that strikes me on hea[r]ing a Misfortune having befalled
another is this. Well it cannot be. helped-he will have the pleasure
of trying the resourses of his spirit'" (I, 186). Here he describes, in
part, an exercise in empathy. The same letter generalizes, however,
on an intellectual and abstract level about the difference between
men of power, "who have a proper self," and men of genius, who
10
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are "great as certain ethereal Chemicals operating on the Mass of
neutral intellect-by [for but] they have not any individuality, any
determined Character" (I, 184). They function as catalysts, in other
words, altering the very nature of the relationship between man
and society. This action is performed most effectively by means of
poems of epic grandeur-Endymion, for example-written by a
poet with a dramatic or Shakespearean genius, able to efface himself and enter into a host of dramatic characters. These poets are
the Shelleyan "unacknowledged legislators of the world." The same
kind of speculation, phrased in more personal or limited terms, appears near the end of the Chameleon-Poet letter: "But even now I
am perhaps not speaking from myself; but from some character in
whose soul I now live" (I, 388).
The annihilation of self by means of empathy need not involve
identification with living persons: the imaginative experience may
begin and end with the imagination. As Keats felt the power of his
imagination strengthening, he felt increasingly that he did "not live
in this world alone but in a thousand worlds," surrounded by
"shapes of epic greatness." "Then Tragedy, with scepter'd pall,
comes sweeping by.' According to my state of mind I am with
Achilles shouting in the Trenches or with Theocritus in the Vales of
Sicily" or with Shakespeare's Troilus, into whom he throws his
"whole being .. . and ... melt[s] into the air" (24 Oct. 1818: I,
403-404). At this time Keats was working on Hyperion.
Either way, there is a dramatic outpouring of the self into some
other being or thing, which may produce poetic results as different
as the Blakean lines of "Where's the Poet?"-" 'Tis the man who
with a bird, I Wren or eagle, finds his way to I All its instincts" (II.
8-10)-and the "Ode to a Nightingale." The lesser poem is an exercise in definition: to the Keatsian poet even "the tiger's
yell I Come,s articulate, and presseth I On his ear like mothertongue" (II. 13-15). The Nightingale Ode, by contrast, is structured
like the record of an exploration, ending on a question. It was written by a Shakespearean poet of Negative Capability, who "is capable of being in uncertainties, Mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching after fact & reason .... With a great poet the sense
of Beauty overcomes every other consideration, or rather obliterates all consideration" -or calculation, or deliberation (27[7] Dec.
1817: I, 193, 194).U Dilke, with whom Keats had had a "disquisition," was again the catalyst for a new insight. The opposing terms
or concepts are of interest, suggesting as they do a quite Byronic
11

KEATS THE HUMANIST

distrust of elaborate intellectual systems of thought : a fine isolated
truth vs. systematic fact and reason (or, put another way, the single
unique insight vs . a comprehensive, reasoned system) , "the sense of
Beauty" vs . "consideration. " This is rather early Keats, although as
late as 24 September 1819 he could find in Dilke the very opposite
of tl}e man of Negative Capability (II, 213). Nevertheless, Keats
came increasingly to reconcile such opposite or seemingly discordant pairs of elements as beauty and truth, "consequitive reasoning" and the real need for knowledge. And paradoxically, it was
Keats's talent for avoiding the "irritable reaching" after self-justification in argument that encouraged him to seek reconciliation of his
contraries.
An example of such reconciliation occurs even in the letter on
Negative Capability, where Shakespeare's Lear provides the
example of "the excellence of every Art, " which is "its intensity,
capable of making all disagreeables evaporate, from their being in
close relationship with Beauty & Truth" (I, 192). To evaporate, one
may recall, is to change a liquid (or a solid) into gaseous form by
means of heat: to transform, in other words, the apparent nature of
reality, even as Wordsworth and Coleridge had planned to do in
Lyrical Ballads, as they divided up their labors, "by awakening the
mind's attention from the lethargy of custom, and directing it to the
loveliness and the wonders of the world before us. " 12 The world, in
short, was to be transformed in the mind by the poem and its
beauty truly revealed. So it was also, Keats perceived, in Lear, a
play not only of transformation (Lear himself) but also of revelation (Cordelia reveals her true self to Lear, Edgar to his father
Gloucester) and reconciliation. 13 Unlike West's painting of Death on
the Pale Horse , in King Lear the "unpleasantness," the "repulsiveness," is buried-it is dead, not alive-by the "momentous depth of
speculation excited" by the play. The "disagreeables" have been
transformed because of the "speculation" to produce finally an
imaginative thing of "Beauty" (I, 192).
Keats wrote a great deal about beauty,· associated with truth not
only by the Grecian Urn . When he said that he could never "feel
certain of any truth but from a clear perception of its Beauty" (31
Dec. 1818: II, 19), he meant that the effect of beauty was therapeutic and ethical. "The mighty abstract Idea I have of Beauty in all
things stifles the more divided and minute domestic happiness" (24
Oct. 1818: I, 403), which is to say, as Blake expressed it, "You
must leave Fathers & Mothers & Houses & Lands if they stand in
12
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the way of Art." 14 .As late as February 1820, he expressed regret
that he had created "no immortal work," but, he added as a kind of
counterweight, "I have lov' d the principle of beauty in all things"
(II, 263). Such love also strengthens the spirit by making it independent or inner-oriented: "Praise or blame has but a momentary
effect on the man whose love of beauty in the abstract makes him a
severe critic of his own Works" (8 Oct. 1818: I, 373). But Keats's
most extended and profound exploration of beauty and associated
subjects occurs in his letter of 22 November 1817 to Bailey, which
expresses a good part of his esthetics. Here we learn that it is love,
like all the other "Passions': in their sublime form or aspect, which
is "creative of essential Beauty" (I, 184), thus transforming our
vision of life and revealing its true nature. Keats refers to a passage
in Endymion (I, 777-815) where love is sung and celebrated as the
great creative force that activates the imagination and permits rich
and "self-destroying" "enthralments" (II. 799, 798). These lead Endymion to his final realization that Cynthia and the Maid of Sorrow are one. The feminine characters have been reconciled-heaven
and earth have been reconciled-and Endymion finally sees the
truth, led to it by his imagination. As Keats explained to his publisher John Taylor, the writing of this passage toward the end of the
first book of Endymion "was a regular stepping of the Imagination
towards a Truth" (30 Jan. 1818: I, 218). Thus the creative imagination, as Keats had written Bailey on 22 November 1817, "may be
compared to Adam's dream" of the creation of the beautiful Eve:
"he awoke and found it truth" (I, 185). There she was, the first female universal particular, palpable and meaningful, symbol of all
others to follow.
As for the Maid of Sorrow, subject of Keats's "little song" of
Book IV, Endymion's relations with her extend his knowledge of all
that Cynthia represents: the essential beauty, the ultimate truth or
reality, includes the "human" maiden. This is the truth that the
imagination first seized or recognized as Beauty. Sorrow has been
transformed, as in Lear, and opposite or discordant qualities reconciled in union at the end.
Keats's highly speculative discussion in the letter to Bailey, which
includes the exclamation "0 for a Life of Sensations rather than of
Thoughts" (I, 185), begins with a sentence on beauty, truth, and
imagination. "I am certain of nothing but of the holiness of the
Heart's affections and the truth of Imagination-What the imagination seizes as Beauty must be truth-whether it existed before or
13
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not-for I have the same Idea of all our Passions as of Love they
are all in their sublime, creative of essential Beauty" (I, 184). It is a
single sentence, and the latter part illuminates the earlier-and says
essentially the same thing: Love, Keats writes, is "creative of" -it
does not create-the essence of Beauty. But it is the imagination
that is the precedent term, and it is the primarily creative power.
For "what the imagination seizes as Beauty," or makes it own or
apprehends as Beauty, must exist-"whether it existed before or
not" (I, 184). That which is newly or freshly apprehended is in fact
newly created. As Blake said, "Mental Things are alone Real" or
truly existent. 15 Shelley expressed the idea somewhat differently:
"nothing exists except but as it is perceived." 16 The imaginative and
sensual apprehension of that which is ideal-" 'a Vision in the form
of Youth,' a Shadow of reality to come" -is clearly different from
truth arrived at by "consequitive reasoning" (I, 185). Keats had
"never yet been able to perceive how any thing can be known for
truth" by this means. And yet this same letter moves on to describe
"a complex Mind-one that is imaginative and at the same time
careful of its fruits-who would exist partly on sensation [experience acquired through the senses] partly on thought-to whom it is
necessary that years should bring the philosophic Mind" (I, 186), as
in Wordsworth's Intimations Ode. Thus the extreme, discordant elements have again been reconciled.
This is not to deny that there is in Keats's thought a strain of antirationalism, which may express itself in terms quite Wordsworthian in their wise passiveness: "let us not therefore go hurrying
about ... buzzing here and there impatiently from a knowledge of
what is to be arrived at: but let us open our leaves like a flower
and be passive and receptive-budding patiently under the eye of
Apollo" (19 Feb. 1818: I, 232). "Diligent Indolence" may become a
richly productive state of mind reconciling opposite, normally discordant qualities (I, 231). All poets wait passively for the Spirit of
the muse to descend upon them, including Byron when the "estro"
is upon him. 17 However, Keats's "What the Thrush Said" is to be
read in the same way that one reads Wordsworth's "The Tables
Turned." Neither poem asserts that every man on every day will
learn more from a single impulse of a vernal wood than all the
sages can teach. Keats was capable of writing on 27 February 1818
that "if Poetry comes not as naturally as the Leaves to a tree it had
better not come at all" (I, 238-239). Similarly, the effect of the
poem upon the reader should seem to be a natural thing: "the rise,
14
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the progress, the setting of imagery should like the Sun come natural [to the reader]-shine over him and set soberly" (I, 238). One
is reminded here of Shelley's great painting growing as naturally
"under the power of the artist as a child in the mother's womb."IB
Nevertheless, Keats did indeed fret after knowledge. The need to
possess it became central for him. However, he drew a distinction
between systematic, abstract reasoning, distrusting it as deeply as
Blake and Byron distrusted it, and genuine knowledge. Temperamentally, all three poets were unfitted to put on the show of logic
that Godwin, for example, was capable of. Keats wrote, as we have
seen, that he did not wish to be a "Reasoner" because he did not
care "to be in the right" (I, 243). Apollonius is his fallen Urizenfigure. Keats's "Read me a lesson, Muse," written upon the top of
Ben Nevis, measures the distance between his mind and Wordsworth's on Mount Snowdon, the elder poet finding there with magnificent certainty "the emblem of a mind I That feeds upon infinity,
that broods I Over the dark abyss ." 19 Keats upon the summit of
Ben Nevis wrote a symbolist poem also, but the sullen mist he
found provided him with a symbol of ignorance (to be overcome),
not knowledge. Dilke, whose mind ran on nothing but Political Justice and his son, was one of "the stubborn arguers" of the world
who "never begin upon a subject they have not preresolved on" (24
Sept. 1819: II, 213), This way of proceeding allows for no progress
at all, of course, and illustrates the kind of sterile, uncreative thinking that is the opposite of the insight characteristic of the poet of
Negative Capability.
Such a poet or poetic thinker thirsts after knowledge, the highest
form of which is knowledge of the suffering human heart. The felt
need of such knowledge or understanding can be almost overwhelming in its intensity: "I find that I can have no enjoyment in
the World but continual drinking of Knowledge" (24 April1818: I,
271). In the Mansion of Life letter "an extensive knowledge
... helps ... to ease the [Wordsworthian] Burden of the Mystery"
(3 May 1818: I, 277). Wordsworth "is a Genius and superior [to]
us, in so far as he can, more than we, make discoveries, and shed a
light in them," that is, illuminate the "dark Passages" of human life
that the older poet explored in Tintern Abbey. England has produced "the finest writers in the world" because the English have
caused them to suffer and to observe the suffering of "the festerings
of Society" (9 June 1819: II, 115). Thus when "Knowledge enormous makes a God of" Apollo, it is chiefly knowledge of human
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suffering, of "gray legends, dire events, rebellions, I
... agonies, I Creations and destroyings" (Hyperion, III, 113-116).
Apollo's "aching ignorance" (1. 107) before his transformation precisely parallels Keats's own state of mind when composing his sonnet "Why Did I Laugh Tonight": "it was written with no Agony but
that of ignorance; with no thirst of any thing but knowledge" (19
March 1819: II, 81).
Although Keats thought that poetry "should strike the Reader as
a wording of his own highest thoughts, and appear almost a Remembrance" (27 Feb. 1818: I, 238), he also knew that "Memory
should not be called knowledge" (I, 231). Blake called it "the ratio
of all we have already known," but insisted that it "is not the same
that it shall be when we know more." 20 Knowledge, Keats wrote, is
created by "original Minds" and expresses itself in the form of "a
tapestry empyrean-full of Symbols for [the] spiritual eye" (19 Feb.
1818: I, 231, 232). Keats had confidence that such originality, although obscured "by Custom," is possessed by many men.
Except allego~ically, and not very clearly, as Apollo dies into
new life, Keats does not explain the nature of the new perception
that transforms the Endymion-like youth into a god. However, despite Apollo's passivity, Keats's own theories of perception assumed
a most active mind and imagination, very different from the pale
personification of Memory, which is Mnemosyne and with whom
Keats was obviously dissatisfied. With one great revisionary leap
from Mnemosyne to Juno Moneta (the admonisher), Keats achieved
that point where Blake began: "Imagination has nothing to do with
Memory." 21 Moneta also recalls one of Blake's giant forms, and her
allocution implies clearly that the poetic imagination cannot truly
exist unless it is an ethical imagination, feelingly alive to the "giant
agony of the world" (The Fall of Hyperion, I, 157). Then "sure a
poet is a sage; I A humanist, physician to all m~n" (I, 189-190).
This ethical imagination, which presupposes that the poet feel empathetically with all that lives, is a distinguishing characteristic of
English Romanticism.
-
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NOTES
1Ernest J. Lovell, Jr., wrote a draft of this essay as part of a booklength study of English Romanticism that he left incomplete at the time of
his death in 1975 . I have revised the essay and completed it.
2 The Letters of John Keats 1814- 1821 , ed. Hyder Edward Rollins, 2
vols. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1958), I,
191-94. I include subsequent references to this edition parenthetically in
the text. For quotations without references, the reader may assume that the
reference is subsumed under the next citation . Keats's poetry is quoted
from The Poems of John Keats, ed. Jack Stillinger (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1978) .
3
Byron's Letters and Journals, ed. Leslie A. Marchand (London: John
Murray, 1973-), IX, 30. Hereafter BL/.
4Compare Byron: "All history and experience-and the rest-teaches us
that the good and evil are pretty equally balanced in this existence-and
that what is most to be desired is an easy passage out of it" (BLJ, IX, 45) .
5For example, in a letter to his publisher John Murray of 24 August
1819, Byron compares himself to the Aztec chief Guatimozin, who, along
with a favorite companion, was being tortured by Cortes to make them
reveal the location of the royal treasure. When he saw his companion
weakening, Guatimozin checked him by asking, "Am I now reposing on a
bed of flowers?" See BLJ, VI, 216, and William Robertson, A History of
America, 3rd ed., 3 vols . (London: W. Strahan, etc., 1780), II, 427.
6
The Marriage of Heaven and Hell, plate 11, in The Poetry and Prose
of William Blake, ed. David V. Erdman, rev. ed. (Garden City, New York:
Doubleday, 1970), p. 37.
7Both Shelley and Lady Blessington noted Byron's chameleon nature.
See Shelley to Byron, 21 October 1821, in The Letters of Percy Bysshe
Shelley, ed. Frederick L. Jones, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1964), II, 358;
and Lady Blessington's Conversations of Lord Byron , ed. Ernest J. Lovell,
Jr. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), pp. 71, 72. Byron was
aware of this characteristic in his own nature, as his note on mobilite to
Don Juan , XVI, 97, indicates.
8
Mi/ton , plate 40, I. 36, in Poetry and Prose, ed. Erdman, p. 141.
Much of plate 38 also insists on the need to put off selfhood.
9
BLJ, V, 105.
10
The Keats Circle, ed. Hyder Edward Rollins, 2nd ed . (Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1965), I, 59. Keats's empathetic
power was of such intensity that lie could imagine himself frying in a
"Gridiron" (Letters, I, 162), and "a sort of ethereal Pig" (ibid., I, 223). On
another occasion Charles Cowden Clarke, who introduced Keats to Spenser's Faerie Queene, noted in his Recollections of Writers (1878) that Keats
"hoisted himself up, and looked burly and dominant, as he said, 'What an
image that is-"sea-shouldering whales"!'" ([Fontwell, Sussex: Centaur
Press, 1969], p. 126) .
11ln this connection, we may compare Blake's "To Generalize is to be an
Idiot To Particularize is the Alone Distinction of Merit" ("Annotations to
the Works of Sir Joshua Reynolds," in Poetry and Prose, ed. Erdman, p.
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630) with Wordsworth's fears of the rational intellect in "Expostulation and
Reply," "The Tables Turned," and "A Poet's Epi taph. "
12 Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, ed . J. Shawcross, 2 vols. (London:
Oxford University Press, 1907; rpt. 1958), II, 6.
13The transformation of the world as it seems to exist within the individual consciousness also occurs within the context of the appearance vs.
reality theme in Don Juan .
14 In "The Laocoon, " Poetry and Prose, ed . Erdman, p. 272.
15 In "The Vision of the Last Judgment," ibid., p. 555 .
16"Essay on Life, " in Shelley's Prose or The Trumpet of a Prophecy, ed.
David Lee Clark, rev. ed . (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press,
1966), pp. 173, 174.
17 Byron's word (BL], V, 157). We may set against Wordsworth's "spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings" Byron's "For what is poesy but to
create I From overfeeling good or ill" (The Prophecy of Dante, IV, 11-12).
Each poet implies a state of previous passivity.
18A Defence of Poetry, in Prose, ed. Clark, p. 294.
19 The Prelude (1850), XIV, 70-72, cited from the edition of Ernest de
Selincourt, rev. Helen Darbishire, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1959), pp.
483, 485.
20 Poetry and Prose, ed. Erdman, p. 2. Cf. Milton, plate 26, I. 46, and
plate 29, I. 18 (Poetry and Prose, pp. 123, 126).
21 "Annotations to Wordsworth's Poems," in Poetry and Prose, ed . Erdman, p. 655.
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